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ABSTRACT 
The United States Army is increasing its force by 65,000 troops over the 
next few years.  Included in this increase are Army aviators.  Retention of the 
current soldiers in uniform is becoming very difficult as the deployment schedule 
of the current Global War on Terrorism wears down the individual aviator.  Army 
Aviation is included in this build up of forces, yet it must also compete with the 
amount of jobs becoming available as the baby boomer generation retires and 
leaves gaps in both the civilian pilot workforce for commercial airlines and also 
the United States Customs air inventory.  This thesis will explore the Aviation 
Incentive program from its outset.  It will then continue with a discussion of 
Auctions and Auction Theory.  It will conclude with a game theory approach and 
other mathematical approaches on bidding in auctions.  Combining Auction 
Theory with the mathematical approach provides the bidder in an auction a more 
educated decision in their bidding strategy.  Utilizing Auctions for Aviator 
retention allows the Army to be more flexible in determining a value for a bonus 
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Army aviation personnel inventories are not meeting the standard fill 
levels.  Current bonus offerings aid in their retention, however, they do not solve 
the problem.  Aviators are still leaving the service after their initial obligations in 
search of work with an airline or with United States Customs.  The Bureau of 
Labor and Statistics predicts 14,000 pilot job openings by the end of 2008 related 
to the baby boomer generation (Dohm, August 31, 2000).  Members of the baby 
boomer generation have reached a very important time in their lives – retirement.  
It is mandatory for pilots to retire at the age of 60.  Given the toll of the current 
war on military aviators, especially Army fixed wing aviators; the civilian job 
market looks attractive.   
There are many factors affecting aviator retention.  In addition to pay and 
benefits afforded to Army Aviators through Aviation Career Incentive Pay (ACIP), 
Aviation Career Continuation Pay (ACCP), and free training, the Army has also 
resorted to recalling aviators from the retired population or aviators who had 
previously resigned to meet inventory quotas.  Army flight pay has gone through 
many changes and has performed several roles, including affecting retention and 
compensating for hazardous duty. 
B. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of this concurrent mixed methods study is to explore Auction 
Theory and apply it to the Army Aviator Bonus system using game theory and 
other mathematical strategies to inform potential bidders on their potential 
submitted bids.  The first phase will be a qualitative exploration of Aviation 
incentives in the military by collecting data from pilot databases at the 
Department of the Army Aviation Branch.  Themes from this collection will then 
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develop into an auction theory model so that the research question can be tested 
with respect to bidding strategies for an aviator.    
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Should the Army reassess its Aviation Career Continuation Pay using 
Auction Theory?  Currently, the Army offers ACCP to only select specialty 
aviators to fill certain retention needs.  However, the Army continues to fall short 
of its personnel needs in these same specialty areas.  The ACCP amount does 
not correlate to the existing need at any specific time.  In FY2003, ACCP was 
terminated due to budget constraints and retention dropped as a result.  Auction 
theory provides a way to optimize retention and minimize costs.   
By researching this question, other questions will be examined.  They 
include:   
1.  How did the Aviation incentive programs originate? 
2.  What would game theory or other mathematical strategies suggest to a 
bidder in an auction format? 
I intend to utilize auction theory so that the Army can reassess the bonus 
payments to its aviators in order to equal that of the other services.  In particular, 
the Army should offer bonuses to commissioned officers who will be in demand 
as the Army expands.  A tool, such as auction theory, can be utilized to 
determine appropriate the bonus to offer a pilot.  
D. THESIS SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
The scope of this study includes:  (1) the background on the current pilot 
situation, both Army and civilian, (2) an overview of historical purpose of ACIP 
and the current ACIP measures relevant today, (3) an overview of auction theory 
and its application as a framework for setting bonus values, (4) a 
recommendation for a solution to use in offering bonuses to Army pilots. 
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E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This thesis is divided into six chapters which provide a logical sequence in 
the analysis of Auction theory and its application to Army Aviator Bonuses. 
Chapter I introduces and outlines the paper.  It starts with a brief 
background of the issue at hand - Army Aviation Bonuses.  The chapter 
continues with the purpose and objectives of the thesis followed by the research 
questions.  The latter end of the chapter covers the thesis scope, the thesis 
methodology, and ends with the chapter overview. 
Chapter II summarizes military compensation from the monetary and non-
monetary perspective.  This chapter continues with a brief history of Aviation 
Incentive pay and Bonus pay.  The chapter ends by describing the current pay 
and benefits afforded to Army aviators. 
Chapter III describes Auction Theory and its key terminology.  The chapter 
will describe the four types of auctions and their key features.  It will continue with 
a description of potential bidding strategies and end with an illustration of Auction 
Theory in practice and how to apply it to Army aviator bonuses.   
Chapter IV will consider applying Auction Theory to aviator bonuses.  This 
chapter will conclude with difficulties that would arise from using auctions for 
aviator bonuses. 
Chapter V offers a mathematical approach to decide on an amount to bid 
and which auction is appropriate for the services.  This chapter will encompass 
game theory and other mathematical strategies. 
Chapter VI will conclude the research and offer recommendations towards 
using Auction theory as a possibility to determine Aviator bonuses in the Army to 
assist in retention.     
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II. COMPENSATION OVERVIEW  
The compensation system has been described as the ‘glue’ that 
binds together the organization, its underlying personnel system, 
and the people who are drawn into the system.  A compensation 
system should attract qualified people into the system, keep them 
there, motivate them, and manage their exit when it is no longer in 
the best interest of the organization or the individual that they 
should stay  (Hogan, 2004, p 39). 
The following describes the military pay and benefits afforded to the 
Military Aviator that affect the aviator’s decision to stay or leave the service.   
A. MONETARY COMPENSATION 
The basic pay table consists of approximately 50 percent of the total cash 
compensation allowed to all service members.  The table is broken down by rank 
for the enlisted soldier, the warrant officer, and the commissioned officer.  It is 
further broken down into years of service.  It does not compensate for experience 
or job title.  It is solely based on rank and years of service (Hogan, 2004).  
Military members are not all offered adequate housing conditions.  
Depending on the base/post assignment, quarters may or may not be offered.  In 
the case where quarters are not offered, a Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) is 
provided.  This BAH allowance depends on rank and whether or not the service 
member has dependants.  Also, each zip code or area throughout the world 
varies in the BAH offered.  For example, a person at the rank of O-4 living with 
dependants in a high cost of living area, such as Monterey, CA, receives a BAH 
of $2327.00; in a different part of the country where the cost of living is not as 
high, such as Fort Rucker, AL, this same officer would receive $1,108.00.    
Overseas tours receive a payment equivalent to the BAH, called Overseas 
Housing Allowance (OHA).  In addition to BAH and OHA, a Cost of Living 
Allowance (COLA) is offered when the BAH and OHA rates are lower than the 
cost of living in a certain area.   
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Military members are also compensated monthly to offset ration expenses.  
This is called the Basic Allowance for Subsistence.  BAS continues to be a 
military tradition of providing room and board (or rations) as part of a 
servicemember's pay.  It is intended to provide meals for the servicemember.  
The monthly BAS rate is based on the price of food. Each year BAS is readjusted 
based upon the increase of the price of food as measured by the USDA food cost 
index.  BAS rates differ between officers and enlisted.  The 2007 BAS Rates are 
$279.88 a month for enlisted and $192.74 a month for officers.   
Every service member, upon signing their initial contracts, knows the 
military provides a retirement system.  This system consists of serving a 
minimum of twenty years of active duty or the equivalent through the reserves.  It 
is a form of deferred cash compensation and “becomes 100 percent vested upon 
completion of twenty years of service, with no vesting before that, it is a dominant 
retention incentive for officers and enlisted members at about the tenth or twelfth 
year of service” (Hogan, 2004, p. 40).  This is very important in an aviator’s 
decision to leave the service, as more civilian aviation companies are 
abandoning their pension plans to those who have retired.   
B. NON-MONETARY COMPENSATION 
The non-monetary compensation benefits the services provide should not 
be discounted.  Full healthcare is covered through the TRICARE system.  For 
minimal out of pocket expenses, the whole family of a service member is covered 
for both medical and dental expenses.   
In addition to healthcare benefits, a military member or family member is 
entitled to services provided through the Commissaries, Exchanges, and the 
many programs offered through the Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) 
service.  All these services are offered at a considerable discount from the 
civilian equivalency.  Other service benefits include low-cost childcare, legal 
services, financial consulting and employment assistance for spouses (Filip, 
2006). 
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The factor that becomes a tremendous benefit to a service member is tax 
exemptions.  The pay factors described above are all taxed; however, the 
allowances described above are not taxed.  Also, goods purchased at the 
Commissary or exchanges are tax-free.  In addition, any pay that is earned in a 
combat zone becomes tax-free.  Another favorable area of tax-benefits includes 
state taxes.  Many states, such as Pennsylvania, do not mandate a 
servicemember to pay state taxes if their home station is not in Pennsylvania.  
Other states offer other incentives.    
The last area that is important, yet not quantifiable, is personal 
satisfaction.  The sense of duty, personal pride, confidence, and leadership 
values that the service provides cannot be taken lightly.  In addition, the training 
provided, especially the pilot training, must be taken into account for 
compensation (Filip, 2006).  According to MAJ James Yastrzemsky, the Aviation 
Branch Representative at the United States Military Academy (personal 
communication, October, 2007), the Army’s flight school estimates that it costs 
approximately between $1.2 million to $2 million to fully train an aviator 
depending on which advanced aircraft the pilot flies.  The advanced aircraft 
include the AH-64 Apache, UH-60 Blackhawk, OH-58 Kiowa Warrior, CH-47 
Chinook, and a C-12 fixed wing. 
C. ARMY AVIATION PAY AND BENEFITS PROGRAMS 
The different services offer special pays and bonuses to various 
occupation-specific or location-specific programs; this thesis is solely looking at 
the special pays and bonuses offered to aviators. 
1. History of Aviator Compensation 
Crew Member flight pay was designed as extra pay for officers to 
compensate for the exceedingly hazardous nature of military flying.  All existing 
flight pay programs today derived from the first legislative authorization of special 
pay for flying duty.  “[F]lying duty was incorporated in the Act of March 2, 1913 
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(Army Appropriation Act of 1914), ch. 93 [Public Law 401, 62d Congress], 37 
Stat. 704, 705 (1913), which gave Army officers detailed to ‘aviation duty’ as 
‘actual flyers of heavier than air craft’ an increase of 35 percent in their pay and 
allowances” (Curtis & United States. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Personnel and Readiness), 2005, p. 282).  The initial years of this incentive 
categorized aviators as military aviators, junior military aviators, and aviation 
students.  Each class of aviator had its own additional pay percentage of 75, 50, 
and 25 percent, respectfully, of their base and longevity pay.  When the Army 
created the Air Service in 1920, the aviator class system was disbanded and all 
aviators were entitled to an increase of 50 percent in base and longevity pay.  
The other services, Navy and Marines, followed suit and in 1922, the Joint 
Service Pay Readjustment Act of 1922 established a uniform flight pay rate 
(Curtis & United States. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and 
Readiness), 2005).  
It was not until 1948, at the request of the Secretary of Defense, that an 
Advisory Commission on Service Pay conducted the first comprehensive study of 
the military pay system since 1908.  In reviewing the flight pay program, the 
commission concluded that, although special pays such as flight pay had been 
designed in part to compensate for arduous and hazardous duties, their main 
purpose should be to fill a supply and demand function while inducing personnel 
to enter upon and remain in hazardous military occupations.  This Commission’s 
recommendations led to the hazardous duty incentive pay provisions of the 
Career Compensation Act of 1949.   This act is the basic source of the existing 
crew member flight pay authority; however, this was amended by the Career 
Incentive Act of 1955.  This amendment introduced longevity step differentials 
based on years of aviation service with respect to rank rather than rank by itself.  
This developed into what is known today as aviation career incentive pay (Curtis 
& United States. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and 
Readiness), 2005). 
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The Aviation Career Incentive Act of 1974 (1) established a system 
whereby an officer involved in the "frequent and regular 
performance of operational or proficiency flying duty" under 
competent orders was entitled to continuous aviation career 
incentive pay independently of whether, during any given year, the 
officer was actually assigned to flying duty; (2) set ACIP rates 
based on the length of an officer's aviation service rather than on 
grade and total military service, although years of officer service 
were used in determining such rates for more senior officers, i.e., 
those with more than 18 years of officer service; (3) set the highest 
ACIP rates for the years immediately following the completion of an 
officer's first obligated tour, which normally coincided with the 
retention-critical, flight-intensive, period of a career; (4) provided for 
the progressive phasing out of ACIP entitlements in the senior, 
less-flight-intensive years of a commissioned career, with total 
elimination of ACIP entitlements after 25 years of  officer service; 
and (5) replaced the former "excusal" system with a set of 
operational flying-time standards, or "gates," for entitlement to 
continuous monthly ACIP (Curtis & United States. Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), 2005, p. 
321-322). 
The ACIP system remained unchanged until 1980, when the rates were 
increased 25 percent by the Military Personnel and Compensation Amendments.  
It was determined that the “need for and desirability of” the increases were 
paramount to improve retention.  The retention problem was also addressed by 
the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1981.  This became the 
foundation for the Aviation Career Continuation Pay (ACCP).  This payment 
consisted of up to four months’ basic pay for each year the officer agreed to 
remain on active duty beyond the expiration of his obligated service.   
 
Officers qualified for such pay had to (1) be entitled to ACIP under 
37 U.S.C. §301a, (2) be in a pay grade below O-7, (3) be qualified 
to perform "operational flying duty," as that term is defined in 37 
U.S.C. §30la(a)(6), (4) have at least six but less than 18 years of 
aviation service as an officer, (5) be in an aviation specialty 
designated as "critical," and (6) have executed a written agreement 
to remain on active duty in aviation service for at least one year. 
The aviation career continuation pay authorized by the provision in 
issue was in addition to any other pay and allowances, including 
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ACIP, to which an affected officer might otherwise be entitled. Any 
agreement adopted under the provision in issue could not extend 
beyond the time an affected officer would complete 19 years of 
aviation service (Curtis & United States. Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), 2005, p 324). 
 
Initially, ACCP was offered only to Navy and Marine Corps aviators 
because they were the only services experiencing retention problems at the time.  
The ACCP program was suspended for a short time and ACIP rates were 
increased, especially to those commissioned officers and warrant officers with 
more than six years of aviation service.  This would target the population that 
would be entering the termination dates of their initial obligation.  The National 
Defense Authorization Act of 1999 prescribed a single ACIP table for all officers 
that is relevant to the present.  The National Defense Authorization Act of 2000 
delegated to the services authority to offer a maximum of $25,000 to those 
officers whose skills are needed for retention.  ACIP provides the incentive to 
perform a hazardous duty; whereas, ACCP serves as a financial incentive to 
retain qualified experienced aviators (Curtis & United States. Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), 2005). 
2. Aviation Career Incentive Pay  
ACIP, for officers and warrant officers, is based on years of aviation 
service, not years of active commissioned service.  The following stipulations 
apply to receive this pay:  to receive continuous flight pay through 18 years of 
service, a pilot must accrue 8 years of operational flying by the 12th year of 
aviation service;  to receive continuous flight pay through 22 years of service, a 
pilot must accrue 10 years of operational flying by the 18th year of aviation 
service;  to receive continuous flight pay through 25 years of service, a pilot must 
accrue 12 years of operational flying by the 18th year of aviation service.  The 

















Figure 2.1. ACIP 
 
3. Aviation Career Continuation Pay 
By law, each service can offer up to $25,000 per year through the 25th 
year of commissioned service.  The only Army specialty offered the full $25,000 
is the Special Operations Aviator.  The rest of the Army’s warrant officer 
population is not entitled to the full amount, yet shortages are still present 
amongst other critical skilled aviators.  The three components of these specialties 
include tactical operations officers, maintenance test pilots and maintenance test 
flight examiners, and special operations officers (Vinch, 2007).  The current 
personnel strength of the tactical operations officer throughout the Army is at 
55% and the maintenance officers average 82% strength between the two 
Years of aviation service 




2 or less $125  
Over 2 $156  
Over 3 $188  
Over 4 $206  
Over 6 $650  
Over 14 $840  
Over 22 $585  
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Over 24 $385  
Over 25 $250  
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specialties (Army aviation FY07 aviation continuation pay (ACP) program, 2006).  
These three skill specialties are only allowed a maximum of $12,000 for 
extending their current contract by three years.  The amount offered ($12,000) is 
not based on a certain percentage.  There are two amounts offered in the Army, 
$25,000 for Special Operator aviators and $12, 000 for all others.   
Although ACCP is designed to address retention needs; it does not seem 
to reflect current specialty needs.  The other services allow the full amount for 
most job skills and decrease the amount according to their retention needs.  For 
example, the Navy offers all pilots and naval flight officers $25,000 a year if they 
sign a five year contract that starts at the completion of their initial obligation 
(Vinch, 2007).  The other three services are unique in that they do not have a 
warrant officer population.  Their officers serve all the roles of an aviation 
community.   
Although the Army is unique, the requirements of flying are not different 
from any other service member or Army warrant officer.  The Army 
commissioned officer performs the additional job titles of leader, commander and 
staff officer.  The Army has deemed the warrant officer as the technical aviation 
specialist.  The Aviation commissioned officer is currently not a retention priority 
and thus, is not afforded an opportunity for an ACCP entitlement (Army aviation 
FY07 aviation continuation pay (ACP) program, 2006).  Overall, “the Army 
currently projects a [commissioned] officer shortage of approximately 3,000 
officers in FY2007, a situation that worsens to 3,700 officers in FY2008 and 
continues to average more than 3,000 annually through FY2013.  This could 
result in 15% to 20% of all positions at the rank of major being vacant or filled by 
more junior and less experienced officers” (Henning & Library of Congress. 
Congressional Research Service, 2006, p. 1).  These percentages reflect all 
branches of the Army, not just Aviation.   
The Army’s ACCP program for FY99 through FY06 was successful in 
decreasing loss rates and increasing warrant officer aviator inventory in all 
targeted MOSs; however, there still remains a shortage in the required inventory.  
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To bolster the inventory, the Army has recalled aviators from retirement or 
voluntary resignation, but that has been insufficient.  Over the last four years, the 
ACCP has been applied at the 7 to 14 year mark of service, while flight schools 
have increased their production to meet requirements.  Despite stabilizing the 
retention of officers offered the ACCP, the Army continues to experience 
shortages.   According to Section 4 of the Army’s Justification Book, 795 aviators 
received ACCP for FY 2006.  The Army estimates that number will increase to 
2,268 aviators by FY 2009 for total amount of $27,213,000 (Department of the 
Army:  Fiscal year (FY) 2008/2009 budget estimates, 2007).  This amount is 
small compared to overall budget (.02%); however, it is nearly a three-fold 
increase in the funding used to retain officers, and projections of inventories are 
still uncertain.   
In FY 2003, the Army did not offer any ACCP contracts, due to budget 
constraints, and consequently inventories decreased.  Although inventories 
increased in FY 2004, it is hard to judge the cause due to the STOPLOSS policy 
(Army aviation FY07 aviation continuation pay (ACP) program, 2006).  
STOPLOSS is a policy provided commanders to alleviate any shortages of 
personnel.  Basically, no one is allowed to leave the Army via resignation and 
retirement.  This policy can be initiated any time when inventories become 
critical; however, the program should not be used as a retention tool.  Pilots who 
are forced to stay in the service after they have decided to leave by way of 
retirement or resignation tend to be disgruntled.  Most officers affected by a 
STOPLOSS policy had fulfilled their contractual services and were eagerly 
looking forward to their lives outside the Army.  Overall, this could affect the 
safety of flying aircraft.  Pilots need to be focused on their flight and not be 
concerned about a STOPLOSS program. 
The growing requirements of aviators and the budget demands of war 




retention through the ACCP program may be to utilize Auction Theory.  
Everything in life comes with a price and the value of something to different 
individuals may vary.   
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III. AUCTION THEORY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
According to Herodotus, auctions existed around 500 B.C. in Babylon, 
where once a year women of marriageable age were sold on condition that they 
be wed” (Cassady, 1967).  This occurrence is the first known and documented 
auction of any kind.  The ancient Romans also used auctions in commercial trade 
and stake claim to have held the most preposterous auction in history in 193 A.D.  
The whole Roman Empire was placed up for auction after the Praetorian Guard 
killed the preceding emperor, Pertinax.  Didius Julianus outbid everyone to claim 
the emperor’s seat; however, he was beheaded only two months into his legacy 
and eventually the Roman Empire was given back to the people (Cassady, 
1967).   
Auctions made their way to the United States via England in its earliest 
times as people immigrated to the west.  The colonists used auctions to dispose 
of property under the judicial process or to close out stocks of merchandise 
(Cassady, 1967).  As areas within the east coast became settled, auctions 
increased.  The most prevalent auction method was the English or ascending-bid 
system (See Types of Auctions Section).   
From its earliest times, the auction has served the purpose of selling a 
good.  Today, almost everyone who has ever connected to the internet is familiar 
with auctions through eBay.  eBay started in 1995 as the brainchild of Pierre 
Omidyar.  Omidyar was trying to help his girlfriend buy and sell her Pez 
dispensers; this Web site ran much like the stock market for people to buy and 
sell consumer goods (Suber, 2007).  From the Pez dispenser idea, this Web site 
evolved to what the internet world knows as eBay – auctions are an everyday 
phenomena.    
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The following section is a compilation of previous NPS Theses on Auction 
Theory.  Information is taken from the following Thesis authors:  William N. Filip, 
Pei Yin Tan, and Henning Hansen Homb. 
B. VOCABULARY OF AUCTIONS 
Auctions come in various forms; however, the terminology of an auction 
remains constant.  The Bidders are the persons competing for the good at hand.  
The Bid-takers are the persons receiving the price offers from the bidders.  The 
Seller is the person who possesses the good or service at hand and who is 
willing to provide it for the right price.  The Buyer is the person looking for a good 
or service. 
C. TYPES OF AUCTIONS 
1. Ascending-bid (English Auction) 
This type of auction is the most common.  It involves bidders raising the 
price until only one buyer is left.  This auction can be run three ways:  1. the 
seller announces prices, 2. the bidders call out their prices, or 3. bids can be 
submitted electronically with the best current price listed (Klemperer, 2004).   
2. Descending-bid (Dutch Auction) 
This type of auction is exactly the opposite of the ascending-bid auction.  
In this scenario, the price starts out higher than any buyer is willing to pay and 
lowers continuously until the first bidder is willing to accept the good at the 
current price (Klemperer, 2004).   
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3. First-price Sealed Bid 
This type of auction consists of each bidder submitting their bid without the 
knowledge of the other bidders.  In this scenario, the good goes to the bidder 
who has submitted the highest bid and the winner pays the price they bid 
(Klemperer, 2004).   
4. Second-price Sealed Bid 
This type is very similar to the first-price sealed bid auctions.  In this 
scenario, the winner is still the bidder who has submitted the highest bid; 
however, the bidder only has to pay the price of the second highest (or first 
excluded) bid (Klemperer, 2004).   
D. KEY FEATURES 
1. Forward Versus Reverse 
a.  Forward Auction 
A Forward Auction is the most common form of auctioning and one that is 
most familiar.  It involves a single seller of a good and multiple buyers bidding for 
the right to purchase that good.  Usually the winner of this type of auction is the 
bidder who submits the highest bid. 
b.  Reverse Auction 
A reverse auction consists of one buyer and multiple sellers vying for a 
specific good.  In a reverse auction, the winner is the bidder with the lowest bid. 
2. First-price Versus Second-price Bidding Strategies 
a.  First-price 
In a forward auction, the winning bidder pays what he bid for the item; in a 
reverse auction the bidder gets paid what he bid.  In the forward auction, if the 
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bidder wins the auction that is below his private-value, then he receives a profit.  
In a reverse auction, the bidder who wins the auction above his reserve price 
receives a surplus.  Bidders can use information or “signals” to determine the 
amount they are going to bid to maximize their profit or surplus.  Bidders will 
under bid their true valuation in a forward auction and they will bid above their 
true valuation in a reverse auction. 
b.  Second-price 
In a forward auction, the winning bidder pays an amount equal to the 
second highest bid.  In a reverse auction, the winner is paid an amount equal to 
the first non-winning bid.  In each case, one’s bid is only used to determine if he 
is the winner.  The amount the bidder pays or gets paid depends on the bids of 
others.  In both types of auctions, the dominant strategy is for each bidder to 
submit a bid equal to their true valuation of the item.   
3. Common Value Versus Independent Private-Value 
a.  Common Value 
The value of the item is common or the same for each bidder; however, 
bidders have different private information about what the value actually is.  For 
example, the value of land that supposedly has oil underground will have the 
same value to any buyer who plans to drill the oil.  Bidders may have access to 
different “signals” about the amount of oil located underground, so they may have 
different perceptions about its common value.  In this case, bidders might change 
their estimate if they learned of another bidder’s signal. 
b.  Independent Private-Value 
The value of the item is whatever the individual bidder values the item to 
be.  This information is private to the bidder.  This does not preclude bidders from 




example of this would encompass a contractor bidding on a job.  The contractor 
knows what the job will likely cost him; however, he does not know what it will 
cost other contractors.  
4. Open Versus Sealed-bid 
a.  Open Auctions 
An open auction consists of the bidders knowing the competitions’ bids.  
Bids can be called out by an auctioneer, the bidders can call out their bids, or a 
bid can be posted electronically.  The key to an open auction is that bidders know 
what others are bidding. 
b.  Sealed-bid 
In a sealed-bid auction, the bidder only knows his bid.  All bids are 
submitted somewhat simultaneously as each bidder submits one bid.  In this 
case, the bidders must estimate what other bidders may bid to maximize their 
chances of winning. 
E. FACTORS WHEN DECIDNG AUCTION FORMAT 
Several factors need to be considered when deciding on the type of 
auction to be used.  The objectives may differ for each seller in different auctions.  
According to the Revenue Equivalence Theorem (RET), the design of the auction 
does not matter as each type generally yields the same revenue for the seller.  
The following factors should be considered when designing an auction: 
1. Revenue Equivalence 
According to the RET, all four types of auctions yield the same revenue on 
average under the following assumptions: 
 -  Bidders are risk neutral 
 -  Independent private-values assumption applies 
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 - Symmetric bidders (each draws from similar probability 
distributions) 
 -  Payment is based only on bids 
If these four criteria are met, it does not matter which design is chosen 
and the expected value for each auction will be generally the same.  For 
example, the English and second-price sealed-bid auctions will yield the same 
revenue as the winner pays the second highest value.  In the Dutch and first-
priced sealed-bid auctions, the winner will attempt to outbid his competition by 
the slightest value to maximize his economic rent.  By meeting the four criteria 
described above, the RET would prove to be correct.  However, most auctions 
will fail to meet the criteria of the RET and bidders tend to act differently within 
each design.  Klemperer raises the issue of collusion and the attractiveness to 
potential bidders as reason for susceptibility.  An auction designer needs to 
understand the purpose of the auction to design it correctly.   
2. Risk Tolerance Amongst Bidders 
Information is a key aspect in all forms of auctions.  In the open form 
auctions, bidders can view their competitors’ bids; whereas, in sealed bid 
auctions, the bidder is dependant on the information he has gathered to submit a 
bid based on his value.  The amount of information or lack of information creates 
uncertainty and risk.   
Generally, a risk neutral bidder’s behavior is not affected by an increase in 
risk, and, therefore, such a bidder will approach all types of auctions in the same 
manner.  On the other hand, most individuals are risk averse and will attempt to 
decrease their risk and increase their certainty.  A risk averse person will tend to 
bid more aggressively to increase the probability of winning and reduce the 
uncertainty.  This also would decrease the surplus value received from the 
product if a risk-averse individual is the winning bidder.  Risk averse bidders will 
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typically generate higher values for the sellers in the Dutch and first-price sealed 
bid auctions compared to the English and second-price sealed bid auctions.   
3. Collusion 
Individual bidders would like to collude in auctions to keep prices at a 
minimum.  In open auctions, collusion could occur through signals among 
bidders or through the bid itself, especially if the product is of value to the bidder.  
In addition, a bidder who is not cooperating with a colluder could be forced into 
paying a much higher price for an item than if the bidder had cooperated.  In 
sealed-bid auctions, collusion is very rare as there is no communication between 
the players in the bidding process; collusion requires pre-agreement concerning 
the sealed bids.   A seller would obviously attempt to thwart collusion, using one 
of the following options.  First, the seller can set a reserve price (see below).  
Second, if the seller becomes aware that collusion is occurring, the item being 
auctioned can be removed and saved for another day.  Third, an auctioneer 
could remove suspected colluders from the auction.  Finally, an auctioneer could 
revert to unethical practices and utilize a ghost bidder to raise the price of an 
auction. 
4. Reserve Price 
For a seller to guarantee an appropriate profit, he may set a reserve price.  
This is a minimum price (forward auction) or maximum price (reverse auction) set 
at the outset to guarantee minimum revenue or maximum cost.  These prices 
must be set carefully so they don’t discourage potential bidders from bidding.  
For example, in a forward auction a seller could set a reserve price of $500 for an 
item when a bidder values that item to be $400.  As a result, this potential bidder 
would not participate in this auction.  If this reserve price scares off all potential 
bidders, the seller would lose his sale even though he could have potentially 
received his value through the auction.   
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Setting reserve prices could also deter collusion.  If the seller sets his 
price to receive a profit, he will get bids assuming the price is not too high.  It 
would not matter if colluders minimized the value or the bids; the seller would still 
receive some profits.  Overall, setting a reserve price would reduce the incentive 
for bidders to cooperate. 
5. Private Information 
As stated previously, information is a key aspect to an auction.  
Information would include knowledge of the product or service, quantity available, 
historical sales, or competition involved.  The value of an item to an individual 
could differ depending on how much he knows about that item.  Auctioneers tend 
to provide information that would increase the bids to increase revenue.  On the 
other hand, certain information may cause bidders to revise their bids downward.  
An auctioneer or seller must decide what and how much information to divulge to 
the bidder.   
Information can also increase uncertainty.  If a seller releases certain 
information that may cause a bidder to increase his value of an item, then the risk 
averse bidder would increase his bid to increase his probability of winning the 
item.   
6. Number of Bidders 
An increase in competition or the number of bidders usually increases the 
seller’s revenue.  In this case, it would be to the seller’s benefit to increase 
participation in an auction.  This could also serve the purpose of a reserve price.  
In Dutch and first-price sealed bid auctions, more bidders tend to generate higher 
bids for an item as increased competition (uncertainty) and risk aversion cause 
participants to alter their bids; whereas increased competition in an English or 




bidder only bids his value of an item regardless of the competition (however, the 
highest and second highest valued bids are likely to increase with increased 
participation).   
7. Other Factors 
Auction design can be influenced by other factors.  These include: entry 
fees to participate in an auction, time limits instilled for the auction, and a 
middleman representing the bidder. 
Entry fees could be charged to participate in an auction.  This could 
separate those undesirable bidders from the more serious bidders.  In addition, 
an entry fee resembles a reserve price, as those with low valuations of an item 
would be excluded.  One drawback to an entry fee, especially in an assignment 
or bonus setting, would be that individual bidders would tire of submitting bids if it 
becomes non-refundable and the guarantee of return dwindles. 
Time limits would control the amount of information that individual bidders 
could collect on other bidders to determine their value of an item or a 
competitor’s bidding strategy.  Time limits would also increase uncertainty.  As 
stated previously, a risk averse participant would bid more aggressively to 
decrease uncertainty.  A tight time limit imposed on an assignment or bonus 
auction for the military would not necessarily be suitable.  Military personnel are 
dispersed throughout the world and information on auctions and ways to submit 
bids may not always be available in a timely manner. 
The last factor to consider is that of the middleman.  A middleman could 
represent the bidder.  To do this, the middleman must know the bidder’s 
valuation and must definitely know the bidder’s maximum bid in a forward auction 
and the minimum bid in a reverse auction.  Also, it would be in the best interest of 
both the seller and the bidder for the middleman to know some information about 
the item up for bid.  A positive aspect of the middleman includes the fact that 
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military personnel could still participate in an auction no matter what their 
geographical or technological status, assuming they understand the previous 
issues.    
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter introduced the history of auctions.  Following the history of 
auctions, a vocabulary of auctions was defined.  Next, the four basic auction 
types were described.  They are the English, the Dutch, the first-price sealed bid, 
and the second-price sealed bid auctions.  Then some key features were 
described.  The difference between forward and reverse auctions, the different 
bidding strategies, the difference between Common Value versus Independent 
Private-Value auctions, and the difference between open versus sealed bid 
auctions were described in this section.  The chapter concluded by looking at the 
design factors that should be considered.  These include: revenue equivalence, 
risk tolerance, collusion, reserve prices, private information, number of bidders, 













IV. APPLICATION OF AUCTIONS 
Utilizing auctions in the Army’s pilot bonus system could enable the 
service to provide a bonus to the commissioned officer pilot; not only the warrant 
officer pilot.  The warrant officer pilot is the Army’s expert when it comes to flying 
its inventory of aircraft and a bonus system is very much needed to ensure the 
manning levels of these experts remains optimal; however, as the Army 
increases by 65,000 soldiers in the upcoming years and as the Global War on 
Terrorism continues, the Army also needs to retain the commissioned officer 
pilot.  Currently no bonuses are offered to these pilots and an auction format 
utilized for the warrant officer retentions could enable the dollars to be spread 
among the other worthy pilots.   
Auctions provide a method where there are no standard values, as the 
value of a pilot in the military could not be determined for every individual.  In 
addition, the price of labor depends on the supply and demand conditions at a 
specific time (Norton, 2007).  For example, if the supply of pilots is low at a 
certain time interval, the price the military would have to pay for a pilot would be 
high; the Army would be willing to pay this price if the demand was high enough.  
On the contrary, if the supply is high for pilots, the military would need to pay a 
lower price for that same labor, and would be willing to pay that price even if the 
demand was lower.  Another reason auctions would be beneficial to use is that 
auctions find the right price for any particular service or product; auctions could 
assist in finding the right bonus for Army pilots as they set the minimum price 
required to retain the targeted number of pilots (Norton, 2007).   
There are several considerations in designing an auction for the context of 
aviator bonuses.  Auctions can also have their drawbacks as complications could 
arise.  These will be noted at the end of the chapter. 
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A. AUCTION FORMAT CONSIDERATIONS FOR ARMY AVIATOR 
RETENTION 
After defining the several options to an auction, it is decided that a reverse 
auction would be utilized for the aviator bonus system.  The military would be the 
sole bid-taker for the services provided by the aviator, and the eligible aviator 
would be the seller of his particular labor service, piloting an aircraft.  Both open 
or a sealed-bid auctions with the final bonus calculated based on the winning bid 
or the second lowest bid could be used to determine the value of the bonus.  Tan 
(2006) and Homb (2006) compare the four auction formats using five decision 
criteria:  efficiency, cost effectiveness, equity, practicality and manipulability.   
1. Efficiency 
Efficiency in auctions is accomplished when the surpluses for the bid-taker 
(US Army) and the bidder (the aviator) are maximized and the “right” individual 
wins the auction.  For example, if the military wants to provide the minimal 
amount of incentive pay and is apathetic about which aviator wins the auction, 
the surplus associated with the incentive bonus will be maximized whenever the 
aviator with the lowest bid wins the auction.  The surplus is independent of the 
actual bonus paid; the actual bonus simply divides the surplus between the Army 
and the aviator (Tan, 2005). 
As stated in the previous chapter, winners of auctions are determined 
differently in each auction and bidders’ strategies will likewise vary per auction 
type.  In English and second-price sealed-bid auction, a bidder who truly bids his 
self valuation and wins by offering the lowest bid is considered efficient.  On the 
contrary, if the bidder witnesses bids lower than his true valuation, he should 
drop out.  In the Dutch and first-price sealed-bid auctions, the bidders must 
consider the values and strategies of the other bidders in the auction and must 
submit their bids based on the auction’s expected surplus and also their own 
expectations of winning the auction.  Information on other bidders would be a 
tremendous benefit to any single bidder if at all possible to obtain.  Auction theory 
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does suggest, however, that the outcome of all four auction types should be 
essentially the same under normal circumstances, where the winning bid is 
achieved by the second lowest bid.   
Homb (2006) points out that the dominant bidding strategy in a second-
price sealed-bid auction is to bid your true value.  However, to many economists’ 
surprise, bidders frequently stray from the norm and under bid their true value in 
reverse auctions, because they believe they then have a better chance of 
winning the auction.  Economists believe this stems from the lack of information 
available in a sealed-bid auction and also because the bidders do not truly 
understand the auction.  With this idea, the revenue equivalence theorem fails 
and with it goes efficiency. 
2. Cost Effectiveness 
The current War on Terrorism has affected the military budget from the 
outset.  As the war continues, more bills emerge and the cost of continuing the 
war grows daily.  Auctions could emerge as a way to keep costs at a minimum or 
reroute the dollars elsewhere by their cost effectiveness.  The objective of 
auction theory in the aviator bonus system would be to provide the aviator the 
minimum possible bonus to retain him.  As stated in the previous chapter, the 
revenue equivalence theorem states that no matter which auction type is chosen, 
the auction’s outcome should yield the same result assuming that all bidders are 
risk-neutral.   
Homb (2006) and Tan (2006) reaffirm that the majority of people are risk 
averse and that the revenue equivalence theorem fails the basic tests that were 
described in the previous chapter.  A risk averse bidder will tend to bid more 
aggressively in a Dutch auction and a first-price sealed-bid auction.  A risk 
averse bidder inherently is willing to sacrifice expected surplus value to increase 
their chance of winning the auction; however, this actually would transfer that 
surplus to the employer (Army).  Accordingly, as the number of bidders 
increases, the more aggressive these bidders become, causing the Army’s 
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surplus to grow even more.  In conclusion, the military would benefit from a 
Dutch auction or a first-price sealed-bid auction if the studies accurately portray 
the bidders to be more risk averse and there are sufficient bidders to maximize 
the surplus to the military while minimizing the payout to the aviator or bidder. 
3. Equity 
In most cases, aviators at the same rank have the same the experience 
levels and educational qualifications.  To pay one individual more than the other 
would be inequitable.  It is a difficult task to assign an equitable bonus in 
auctions; however, the second-price auction formats ensure equal pay since the 
winners of a specific auction are paid the same bonus.  On the other hand, a 
different pool of aviators with the same experience could yield a different bonus 
value in a different auction.  The other auction formats do not yield the same 
bonus to similar aviators and the valuations can vary tremendously between 
individuals depending on the level of competition.  If there was one auction, the 
second price format would be chosen.  However, requirements to retain aviators 
differ yearly and a different auction would be needed each time; therefore, no 
auction format fits perfectly in the bonus context (Homb, 2006). 
According to Professor William Gates (personal communication, 
September, 2007), the other definition of equity is equal surplus values across 
similar people.  If one aviator will reenlist for $2,000 and the other for $25,000, 
and they both get paid $25,000, the first aviator receives a $23,000 profit, or 
surplus, while the second receives zero.  It might be more “fair” to pay the first 
aviator $23,000 and the second aviator $45,000, giving both a profit, and surplus 
of $20K.  There have been complaints that some service members receiving 
bonuses would have reenlisted for nothing, so they are essentially receiving 
“free” money, or pure profit.  A first-price sealed-bid auction is more equitable in 




The open auction formats are literally not feasible in a military setting.  It 
would be impossible to gather all potential aviators (bidders) in one place, even 
virtually, to conduct the auction.  It would also defeat the purpose of saving the 
service money as each aviator would have to be paid for their travel and 
accommodations in order to participate in the auction. 
A much easier and manageable auction would be the sealed-bid option.  
As far as which type to conduct, first or second-price, that would be a matter of a 
simple education, which could be done through the internet.  The reason for the 
education about an auction reflects the fact that most people are only familiar 
with first-price type auctions, where they submit a bid, the bid with the lowest 
value (reverse auction) wins the auction and the winner receives the price bid.  
Although, it is not inherently difficult to understand the second-price auction, it is 
unfamiliar territory to most observers. 
Another factor that would need to be clarified is the idea of the reverse 
auction.  Most military members understand how contracts are awarded, 
especially aviators, and therefore would need to realize that the lowest bid or 
second lowest would turn out to be the winner.  This may seem obvious; 
however, it is important to ensure that everyone participating in the auction 
understands specific details of the auction.  The bottom line is that dollars are 
involved and both sides, the military and the aviator, need to be aware of the 
rules.  The sealed-bid auction could be accomplished through a secure internet 
site or a more formal memorandum sent by the individual aviator.  In both cases, 
it is more practical to conduct a sealed-bid rather than an open-bid auction.  
Finally, the first-price auction would be an obvious choice to conduct as most 
aviators are already aware of the format; however, if the right education is 
performed, the second-price would be just as feasible and produce a better 
option to the service. 
 
 30
5. Manipulability  
A sealed-bid auction would be the most advantageous type to avoid 
manipulation or collusion, as described in the previous chapter.   First, the 
bidder (aviator) could collude more easily in an open auction as each member 
would be able to witness others’ biddings and each person’s valuation.  As 
described above, an open auction would not be feasible anyway.  Collusion in 
sealed-bid auctions depends in part on the number of aviators bidding.  If the 
number of aviators bidding in an auction is large, colluding would be kept to a 
minimum; however, if the number is small, the chance of collusion increases.  It 
increases even more when the bidder’s know each other.  In the case of aviators, 
the likelihood that an aviator knows the other aviators he is bidding against is a 
concern as most aviators progress together from their initial training and proceed 
with their careers through very similar pathways.   
For the purpose of this thesis, collusion would be difficult even with a small 
number of aviators bidding due to the following reasons: the Global War on 
Terrorism has put aviators all over the world and it would be difficult for aviators 
to contact one another and receive a timely response.  Furthermore, even though 
most aviators have followed the same career path, their military service times are 
not all the same, as some aviators served as prior enlisted while others became 
aviators directly from high school through the Army’s “High School to Flight 
School” recruiting technique.  These factors inhibit collusion and would work as a 
mechanism to separate the aviators that have been tracking career paths 
together.  The other way to avoid collusive activity would be to alter the auction 
format and set a time limit for submitting bids.  The aforementioned auction 
format considerations would apply.   
The bid-taker in the auction could also manipulate the auction and the 
bidding process.  In a second-price sealed-bid auction, the bid-taker could input a 
bid just above the lowest bid in order to grant the winner an amount close to the  
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lowest bid.  In a military style auction, it would be difficult to accomplish this in a 
public forum; however, it is a concern that the aviator (bidder) would consider 
when deciding on his bid.   
The collusion dynamic is a real issue that must be factored in when 
deciding on an auction format.  The sealed-bid format would be the most 
advantageous way to overcome this issue. 
B. COMPLICATIONS WITH THE USE OF AUCTIONS IN DETERMING THE 
AVIATOR BONUS 
Of all the considerations described, the equity issue would be the most 
difficult to overcome.  Although each individual aviator submits a bid with their 
true valuation, theoretically, the amount offered for a bonus would need to be 
equal among the ranks.  As stated above, this would be viable in a single 
auction; however, if multiple auctions were needed in sequential timeframes, the 
bonus offered could be different than a previous auction.     
Another complication could arise if an aviator feels that his qualifications 
and experience overshadow others and submits a higher bid than his true 
valuation.  Although this aviator may indeed perceive his experience correctly, he 
could lose the auction, not receive the bonus offered, and the Army could lose 
valuable experience in that particular aviator.  Experience and qualifications differ 
immensely in the aviator arena.  Aviators throughout the population would need 
to be educated to submit bids based solely on their true valuation. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed five factors that must be considered to evaluate an 
auction for aviator bonuses in the Army:  efficiency, cost-effectiveness, equity, 
practicality, and manipulability.  It was determined that the second-price sealed-
bid auction would be the best option for the Army aviator bonus system.  After 
outlining these considerations, it was determined that there are two main 
complications to conducting an auction for Army aviator bonuses.  The first would 
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be equity of the bonus among the individual aviators and the second would be 
practicality; aviators might be tempted to submit higher bids than their true 
valuation.  They would base their higher bid on what they perceive to be their 
worth.  They could, in turn, lose the auction and not be offered the bonus that 
would resulted from the auction.  The Army would lose a valuable aviator and the 
aviator could end his illustrious career.  A complete understanding of the auction 
and its format could overcome these issues. 
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V. GAME THEORY AND STRATEGY APPROACH TO AVIATOR 
AUCTIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 Anyone associated with the government understands the concept of 
government contracts and who the winner is – the lowest bidder.  These 
contracts are usually bid in the form of a sealed-bid.  In the sealed-bid “envelope” 
is the price for which that particular company says it can do the job.  The amount 
that the contractor, wrote on that sealed-bid depended on different things.  First 
was likely the actual cost of doing the job.  Second could be the amount of profit 
the contractor would be willing to accept.  Third would possibly include an 
estimation of what the other contractors might bid.  Fourth might be a careful 
calculation of the amount that would increase the contractor’s chances of winning 
the bidding auction or contract.  Considering these factors, the contractor has to 
decide what price to write down in his bid.  If he underbids, he may increase his 
chances of winning the contract; however, in the end, he reduces his profit 
margin and might not cover all his expenses incurred in the actual contract work.  
If he overbids, he would potentially increase his profit margin; however, the 
chances of him winning the contract dwindle.  The third option would be to bid 
the true valuation of the contract.   
 Dixit and Nalebuff (1991) note in their book, Thinking Strategically, that 
choosing your bid is a strategic decision in a first-price auction.  Suppose costs of 
all potential bidders are distributed uniformly and randomly over some range 
involving 10 possible bidding increments, and, as a contractor, your cost is at the 
midpoint of that range.  Five times out of ten, some rival will bid less than your 
actual cost in a first-price auction and you will loose the auction whether you over 
inflate your bid or bid your true cost.  Four times out of ten, a rival will inflate their 
bid and you could have won the contract with an inflated or an actual cost bid, 
with the inflated bid earning you more profit.  There is a one chance in ten that a 
rival submits a bid at essentially  your actual cost.  Therefore, an actual cost bid 
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may win you the contract, but the profit margin is minimal, as you would just 
cover the costs, and the contract was barely worth having anyway.   In these 
cases, Game Theory suggests that submitting an inflated bid is a dominant 
strategy.  The other participants in the auction are usually thinking along these 
same lines anyway (Dixit and Nalebuff, 1991, p 319-320). 
 The above scenario could be used to describe the bidding process for an 
aviator when submitting his bonus value in a first-price reverse sealed-bid 
auction.  If the aviator over inflates his bid, he may lose out.  If he underbids his 
true value, than he is technically not being paid his worth.  If he bids his true 
value, he maximizes his chances of winning the auction, but doesn’t receive any 
surplus value. 
 This chapter will encompass a two-person reverse auction situation for 
both a first-price and a second-price auction scenario.  Using a pure Game 
Theory approach and other mathematical models, the analysis will determine the 
bid an aviator should submit. 
B. GAME THEORY 
Conflict has been a central theme throughout human history and 
literature.  It arises whenever two or more individuals, with different 
values, compete to try to control the course of events.  Game 
Theory uses mathematical tools to study situations involving both 
conflict and cooperation.  Its study was greatly stimulated by the 
publication in 1944 of the monumental Theory of Games and 
Economic Behavior by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern 
(COMAP, 1996, p. 561). 
 A game consists of players and strategies that lead to outcomes.  In 
Game Theory, the players consist of individuals, organizations, and sometimes 
even countries.  Strategies are the options or courses of action between which 
the players must decide.  Once the players decide on strategies, an outcome 
occurs which determines the consequences of their decision. Game Theory 
assumes that individuals prefer different outcomes.  “Game Theory analyzes the 
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rational choice of strategies – that is, how players select strategies to obtain 
preferred outcomes” (COMAP, 1996, p. 561).   
 As stated previously, Game Theory analyzes situations in which there are 
at least two players rather than an individual making a decision.  An outcome 
depends on the decisions of the other players.  Sometimes these decisions may 
be cooperative; however, most of the time the decisions are uncooperative, such 
as two teams competing on the playing field.  In these situations, one team’s gain 
is another team’s loss.  In economics however, joint gains could be realized 
through minimal cooperation.   
There are two basic conflict games in Game Theory: total-conflict and 
partial-conflict.  Total-conflict consists of one team winning while the other loses, 
which is known as zero-sum.  The best example of this occurs in a football game 
where, in most cases, cooperation with the other team never occurs.  When the 
game finally ends, there clearly is a winner and a loser.  A partial-conflict 
instance occurs when the players can actually benefit from cooperation, but, 
nonetheless, may have an even stronger incentive not to cooperate.  An example 
of a partial conflict game is that of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, one of the most 
famous Game Theory scenarios, which will be described in section E.  This 
thesis will encompass both approaches in its design. 
C. GAME THEORY ASSUMPTIONS 
 The following assumptions are made in order to develop the matrices 
required to understand the outcomes of the partial conflict game and the zero 
sum game. 
 1.  The bonus amount is congressionally dictated to be a maximum of 
$25,000 a year. 
 2.  The two players bidding for the bonus differ in their beliefs of their true 
value.  The first aviator considers herself average and decides that her potential 
bids include the following options:  Underbid - $2,000; True Value - $9,000; and 
Overbid - $16,000.  The second aviator considers himself to be a superior aviator 
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based on his experience and qualifications.  His bids consist of the following:   
Underbid - $6,000; True Value - $15,000; and Overbid - $25,000. 
 3. The values for the game are arbitrary and based on the author’s 
personal experience with aviators, histories of bonuses given by the Army and 
other services, and are cardinal values (the value of the bid is the actual 
number/1000). 
 4.  This chapter will be analyzed using the following matrix of the each 
bidder’s values.  See Figure 5.0 below. 
 
 
Figure 5.0 Cardinal Value Matrix 
 
D. TOTAL CONFLICT – ZERO SUM 
A zero-sum game is one in which the payoff to one player is the negative 
of the corresponding payoff to the other player, so the sum of the two payoffs is 
always zero.  Basically, one player benefits at the other’s expense.  Auction 
theory does not allow a zero-sum to exist.  For example, a way to possibly 
develop a zero-sum matrix, such as in Figure 5.1, would be to run a first-price 
reverse auction.  The lowest bid wins, and the loser of the game does not receive 
a bonus and also has to pay the winner the amount won in the auction.  This 
does not provide any value to an auction in any of its uses for bonus amounts for 
jobs or skills, but serves as an introduction to a standard Game Theory concept.  
This game consists of the players bidding their values based off of Figure 5.0.  
An example of how the values are achieved in the matrix is described as in the 
(Over, Over) part of the matrix.  Rose overbids the value of $16,000 while Colin 
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overbids his value of $25,000.  In the reverse auction, the lower bid wins; 
therefore, Rose wins with the bid of $16,000.  Because Colin overbid, he loses 
the reverse auction and has to pay out $16,000 to Rose according to the rules of 
zero-sum games.   
 
Figure 5.1 Zero-Sum  
 
 It would not be feasible to study a zero-sum game for the purposes of 
aviation bonuses with respect to auction theory.  However, a way to utilize Game 
Theory, and determine bidding strategies would be look at a partial conflict 
scenario by utilizing payoff matrices in both a first-price and a second-price 
reverse auction.  An example of a partial conflict game is described below in the 
partial conflict scenario with the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
E. PARTIAL CONFLICT 
Two-person partial-conflict games are variable-sum games in which 
the sum of payoffs in each of the four payoff strategy spaces varies, 
and does not necessarily sum to zero as in zero-sum games. 
Invariably, in partial-conflict games there are some reciprocal gains 
both players can realize through cooperation, but this is often 
improbable in the absence of either good communication or trust. 
When trust or communication is poor, the condition is set for a 
noncooperative game, whereby no binding agreement is possible 
or enforceable. Even in instances allowing communication, there is 
no assurance that a player can trust another player to choose the 
particular strategy that he promised to select. Self-interests may 
actually result in choices that yield lower payoffs than could have 
been achieved through cooperation (Ecklund, 2005, p. 25-26). 
1. Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 One of the most recognizable games or situations in Game Theory is the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, which originated from Princeton mathematician Albert W. 
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Tucker in 1950.  The Prisoner’s Dilemma is as follows.  Two individuals are 
accused of a crime and are held separate from each other.  Each has two 
choices: the first is to maintain his innocence and the second is to sign a 
confession also accusing the other individual of the crime.  Each knows that if 
neither of them talks, the case against them would be weak and the authorities 
will convict and punish them for lesser charges, warranting only one year in 
prison.  If both confess, each will get ten years in prison. If only one confesses 
and testifies against the other, the uncooperative prisoner will receive fifty years, 
while the cooperative prisoner will get parole.  See the matrix below, Figure 5.1, 
for an illustration of the “payoffs” for each player and their respective decision, 
where the numbers within the matrix are the number of years in prison.  A 
smaller number is preferred in this scenario. 
 
 
 Confess Don’t Confess 
Confess 10 , 10 0 , 50 
Don’t Confess 50 , 0 1 , 1 
Figure 5.2 Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 
 A rational acting player would choose his dominant strategy of “Confess” 
in order to maximize his payoff.  “Confess” is a dominant strategy because it 
provides a better payoff (shorter prison time) for both possible decisions by the 
other player.  This would result in both prisoners going to jail for ten years (10 , 
10).  This is the game’s non-Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium.  For both prisoners 
“Confess” dominates “Don’t Confess,” even though the mutual-Confess outcome 
(10 , 10) is worse for both prisoners when compared to the mutual-Don’t Confess 
outcome (1 , 1).   
Dominant strategies in games of noncooperation and simultaneous moves 
will not always guarantee the best payoff.  If either prisoner decided to depart 
from his dominant  strategy to Don’t Confess, the result for that prisoner would be 




confess would get parole.  This choice is clearly not rational, and deters both 
prisoners from departing from the Nash equilibrium (10, 10). Even if both 
prisoners had discussed the mutual benefits of not confessing before their 
capture, the outcome is still unstable because the incentive of zero time in prison 
is still present and available.  If Rose believed that Colin would hold up his end of 
the bargain by not confessing, Rose’s incentive is to confess to obtain the more 
desirable payoff of being set free. Each prisoner would be enticed to go back on 
his word and pursue a strategy of Confess (Ecklund, 2005).  Thus, this leaves us 
with the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
2. Partial Conflict Game 
 Based on the above assumptions, a game develops with a payoff matrix 
as shown in Figure 5.3 and 5.4.  This game consists of the players bidding their 
values and a winner is determined by a first-price or a second-price reverse 
auction.  The winning bid is then compared to the individual’s true value and a 
respective payoff is found to determine the payoff matrix.  The first payoff matrix 
will be that of the second-price reverse auction in Figure 5.3. 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Second-Price Reverse Auction Payoff Matrix 
 
 The values in the above payoff matrix are determined by the following 
steps.  First, it was determined which player won the auction within the matrix 
using the cardinal value matrix from above in Figure 5.0.  For example, in the 
case where both players underbid their true values, Rose would win the auction 
because she submitted the lowest bid of $2,000.  The next step is to determine 
the winning bonus amount of the auction.  In the case of the second-price 
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auction, the value of this auction bonus is $6,000, the excluded bid submitted by 
Colin.  To determine the value within the payoff matrix, the value won is then 
compared to her true value of the bonus she believes she needs to receive for 
her to stay in the service.  Since her true value is $9,000, her net value is actually 
-$3,000; she has accepted a bonus $3,000 below her true value.  The rest of the 
matrix was determined the same way.  
 As a result of the expected payoffs from the above scenario, it is 
determined that both Rose and Colin should bid their true values.  For Rose, she 
could hurt herself by underbidding if Colin underbids and she receives a positive 
net value in two out of the three scenarios in which she bids her true value, 
compared to only one out of three when she overbids.  She cannot do any better 
by overbidding, no matter what Colin bids.  For Colin, his only positive net value 
payoff occurs when he bids his true value and when Rose overbids.  He receives 
$1,000 more than his true value of $15,000.  He can hurt himself by underbidding 
and lose a possible net value gain by overbidding.  By underbidding or 
overbidding, Colin and Rose can do no better than bidding their true value, and 
possibly do worse. 
 In a second-price reverse auction, it is a dominant strategy for both 
players to bid their true values if they have no prior signals or information on the 
other bidder or bidders.  This would most likely be the case in the aviator bonus 
scenario as all the aviators would be spread around the world and collusion 
would be very difficult to coordinate (or “arrange”) amongst them. 
 The next scenario is similar to the one outlined above; however, the first-
price reverse auction scenario will be modeled.  In this case, everything remains 
the same as the second-price auction, but the bonus amount awarded is the 




Figure 5.4 First-Price Reverse Auction Payoff Matrix 
 
The values in the above payoff matrix were determined in the same 
manner as the second-price; however, the bonus amount awarded was the 
winning bid, which is then compared to the each player’s true value.  
In the first-price scenario, Rose has a dominant strategy to overbid her 
value.  In this case, she wins the auction and the amount paid is $15,000.  Based 
off of her values, she receives a net value gain of $7,000.  She definitely hurts 
herself by underbidding in the first-price reverse auction.  She does not 
necessarily hurt herself by bidding her true value, but she foregoes any chance 
to gain a net value; she only receives a positive net value if she overbids.  For 
Colin, it does not matter whether he bids his true value or overbids; he does not 
receive any net value.  He does receive a loss in his net value by underbidding 
even though he may win the auction when Rose bids either true value or 
overbids. 
For bidders to bid their true value, the second-price auction is the auction 
design that encourages that behavior.  In the first-price auction, bids determine 
the probabilities of winning and the surplus awarded.  Most participants are used 
to first-price auctions and understand them.  To understand the process of the 
first-price bid, Decision Theory can be explored to show the relationship between 




F. DECISION THEORY 
1. Introduction 
 Decision Theory is a tool developed to assist people in choosing among 
different alternatives in complex situations.  For an aviator, the alternatives are 
whether to underbid, overbid, or go with his true value.  Most of the time, options 
are clearly defined and the consequences can be predictable; however, there is 
uncertainty in the exact outcome of the event.  Information may be available for 
the likelihood of different outcomes, but uncertainty still exists (Straffin, 1993).  
The following is a simple example of Decision Theory. 
It’s a warm, humid morning and you are about to leave your 
apartment to walk down to the campus that is six blocks away.  
You’re worried that it might rain, so you consider taking your 
raincoat.  Although your raincoat is great at protecting you from 
downpours and keeping you nice and dry, it’s rather bulky and ugly 
and you’d prefer not to take it along if you don’t really need it.  You 
have two possible actions: take the raincoat with you or leave your 
raincoat at home.  There is an unknown “state of nature”: It may or 
may not rain.  There are four possible outcomes depending on your 
action and state of nature: 
A:  Take raincoat, it rains 
B:  Take raincoat, it doesn’t rain 
C:  Leave raincoat, it rains 
D: Leave raincoat, it doesn’t rain 
You will obviously be happier with some outcomes than with others.  
The worst possibility is that you decide to leave the raincoat in your 
apartment and it pours as you walk to campus, drenching you to 
the skin, soaking your clothes, and perhaps ruining your books.  
The happiest eventuality occurs when you leave your raincoat 
behind and no rain comes down.  Then you are both dry and free of 
the burden of lugging the coat.  The other two outcomes (when you 
take the raincoat) are somewhat in between; once you’ve gone to 
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the bother of wearing the coat, you’d probably have a happier 
sense of vindication if it did rain than if it didn’t (Straffin, 1993, p 
539) 
2. Applying Decision Theory to the Auction 
 Decision analysis assists in dealing with complicated situations.  The 
aviator must decide whether to underbid and increase his chances of winning the 
auction but receiving less money than what he feels he deserves; or he must 
decide to overbid and decrease his chances of winning the auction, realizing, 
however, if he does win his surplus is maximized in the bonus he receives; or he 
must decide to bid his true value and hope that others do the same.  The aviator 
must balance between the conflicting demands of maximizing expectation (the 
bonus amount) and minimizing the risk (winning or losing the auction).  “[O]ne 
guiding principle is always present: Determine as best you can the probabilities 
… for the various outcomes as well as the value, or utility, of these outcomes” 
(Straffin, 1993, p.540).  Once this determination has been made, the expected 
value of the scenario can then be computed.  An expected value is defined as: 
EV = ap + b(1-p), where payoff a occurs with a probability of p, payoff b occurs 
with a probability of (1-p).  Applying the Dixit and Nalebuff example introduced in 
the beginning of this chapter, to the aviator bonus auction scenario, five times out 
of ten (.5) some rival will bid less than the actual required bonus, four times out of 
ten (.4), a rival will bid over the required bonus, and one chance in ten a rival 
submits a bid at approximately the required bonus or true value. 
 To apply this expected value model to the decisions facing Rose and 
Colin, assume that Rose and Colin don’t know each other’s true required bonus, 
but know that they follow a uniform distribution.  The values of the bids, for a risk 
neutral bidder, range from $0, reflecting that an aviator will continue to remain in 
service at no additional cost, to $25,000, for aviators that would only be willing to 
stay in the service if paid this amount.  The probability associated with each bid is 
the same, thus the uniform distribution.  The following graph shows the uniform 
distribution, Figure 5.5,  
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Figure 5.5 Uniform Distribution of Bids vs. Probabilities 
 
In the above scenario, each player knows his or her own true value.  However, 
they do not know the other’s true value.  In a first-price auction, it would make 
sense for either bidder to bid below their true value.  If they do, their chances of 
winning the auction do increase; however, they would win the first-price reverse 
auction and receive a negative surplus.  Decision Theory comes into play with 
this scenario in describing how each bidder determines his or her  bid.  As I just 
stated, neither person would bid below his or her  true value, but the question is 
how much to bid above that value and what is the associated chance of winning 
the auction.  In the uniform distribution ranging from 0 to 25 in thousands, the 
25
25))(( BwinsbidderP −=  and )_()( valuetrueBbidderSurplus −= .  Rose’s true 
value remains $9,000.  If she bids her true value and bids must be in $1000 
increments, she has a 
25
16 chance at winning the auction.  For every dollar she 
increases her bid, her chance of winning decreases; however, if she wins, her 
surplus increases.  For example, Rose’s chance of winning the auction at a bid of 
$12,000 decreases to 
25
13
 , but she receives a surplus of $4,000 if she wins the 
auction.  The same scenario arises with Colin and his bids.  At Colin’s true value 
of $15,000, he has a 
25
10
 chance of winning the auction.  As Colin increases his 
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bid he also decreases his chances of winning a first-price auction; however, he 
also increases his surplus should he win.   
 The next step to Decision Theory, is to determine the value that balances 
the surplus for each bidder with the probability of winning the auction.   This is 
done in the following manner.  For Colin, his true value remains at $15,000.  He 
bids (B), therefore:  15)( −= BColinSurplus .  The probability of winning is 
25
25))(( BwinsColinP −= .  The expected surplus is calculated by multiplying 
))(()( winsColinPColinSurplus ∗ .  The value can be calculated by the 
following:
25
375402 ++− BB .  The maximum expected surplus is found by taking 
the first derivative of this equation and then setting it equal to zero.  After the 
derivative is taken, a simple equation determines the value that Colin should bid.  
For Colin, his equation is 402 =B or 20=B .  Therefore, Colin should bid $20,000.  






.  Should he win this auction, his surplus 
would be $5,000. 
 Rose’s situation is determined in exactly the same manner; however, her 
true value is lower at $9,000.  She bids (B), therefore:  9)( −= BRoseSurplus .  
The probability of winning is 
25
25))(( BwinsRoseP −= .  Her expected surplus is 
calculated by multiplying ))(()( winsRosePRoseSurplus ∗ .  The value can be 
calculated by the following:
25
225342 ++− BB .  Her maximum expected surplus is 
calculated by taking the first derivative of this equation and then setting it equal to 
zero.  After the derivative is taken, a simple equation determines the value that 
Rose should bid.  For Rose, her equation is 342 =B or 17=B .  Therefore, Rose 
should bid $17,000.  Her chances of winning are 
25
8
.  Should Rose win this 
auction, her surplus would be $8,000. 
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 As illustrated by the above calculations, the following information could be 
extrapolated from using Decision Theory with an expected value model:  knowing 
what the true value of the auction, a bidder can determine the probability of 
winning and the expected payoff or surplus for each possible bid.  Furthermore in 
a first-price reverse auction, no bidder would bid less than his or her true value 
as it would only result in a net loss of revenue.  In general, risk neutral bidders 
would determine the bid that maximizes expected utility.  In this case, Rose and 
Colin would bid 17,000 and 20,000, respectively.  Rose would win the auction 
and receive a 17,000 bonus.  Notice that in this case, the first price auction 
results in a higher bonus payment than the truth-revealing second price auction 
(Rose wins and receives 15,000).  Clearly, the relative outcomes depend on the 
number and characteristics of the bidders involved.  The revenue equivalence 
theorem, described previously, indicates that the two auctions outcomes will 
coincide on average with a sufficient number of risk neutral bidders.  If bidders 
are risk averse, the first price auction will reduce the cost of retention bonuses. 
In a first price auction, how much might a bidder strategize and what 
happens if communication could occur amongst bidders?  The following section 
on Strategic Moves provides insight on how bidders may communicate.   
G. STRATEGIC MOVES 
 “Games” in real life are played in one of two ways: with communication or 
without communication between players.  Everyday people utilize strategic moves 
without even knowing it.  For example, a strategic move that everyone plays in the 
military is that of the assignment process.  When a member of the military is 
conversing with his career manager on assignments, he is trying to influence the 
outcome of duty station by using strategic moves, such as commitments, threats, 
and promises.  Both participants in the process (military member and Branch 
Manager) have their own ideas about what assignment should be given.  The 
military member considers issues like location, family and career; the branch 
manager considers the service’s needs.  For each person to achieve his goal, one 
must sometimes utilize “strategic moves”.  For example, a branch manager may 
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promise the assignment that the military member wants if the member is able to go 
to another assignment at first to fill a requirement for the branch manager.  Also, the 
military member may threaten resignation if he does not get his choice assignment.  
Sometimes both threats and promises are needed.  
1. Strategic Moves Description 
 Ecklund (2005, pp. 31-33) provides a synopsis of strategic moves written by Straffin 
(1996) with the following text.     
 Straffin (1996) describes most situations where players do 
not choose strategies simultaneously or choose strategies without 
communication. Strategic moves in zero-sum games with no 
saddlepoint and consecutive moves gives [sic] the player who 
moves last the distinct advantage and benefits from knowing the 
other player’s choice before moving himself.  In variable-sum 
games there are instances when it is beneficial to make the first 
move.   
 If not possible for one player to move first in a game, 
communicating a commitment to a move could achieve the same 
effect.  The difficulty arises in trying to make a commitment 
convincing to the other player, especially when the other player 
would like to commit and when conflicting commitments are 
mutually damaging.  In cases where conflicting commitments are 
mutually damaging, one can make a commitment, and then sever 
communications, thereby forcing the other player to either give in or 
risk receiving a less preferred outcome (Straffin 1996, 85-86).  
 In situations where commitments would not affect the game, 
one may be able to apply an effective threat.  A threat in the context 
of game theory must have the following properties: (1) “Player 1” 
agrees to take a certain action contingent on a previous action by 
“Player 2;” (2) Player 1’s action will be harmful to Player 2; and (3) 
Player 1’s action will also harm Player 1. Credibility is the crux of 
the successful use of threats, and is difficult to achieve since the 
obligation is to a self-harmful action (Straffin 1996, 86-88).  
 In instances where threats are not credible, a promise may 
be appropriate, and has the following properties: (1) Player 1 
agrees to take a certain action contingent on a previous action by 
Player 2; (2) Player 1’s action will be beneficial to Player 2; and (3) 
Player 1’s action will harm Player 1.  Once again, the issue for 
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effectively applying this strategic move is credibility, especially 
convincing one’s opponent of a commitment to take a self-harmful 
action.  In cases where threats and promises are not sufficient, a 
combination of both a threat and a promise might be sufficient to 
change the outcome if they are both credible.  In other instances, 
no combination of commitments, threats, or promises can change a 
game (Straffin 1996, 86-88). 
2. Strategic Moves Model 
 Thus far in the thesis, the aviators have submitted bids simultaneously 
and without communication.  In real life, it may not work like this, especially in the 
aviator field.  Aviators are a very close knit group and often keep in touch with 
one another, especially when new items of interest arise with respect to their 
aircraft.  Another item of interest might be the amount of a bonus; aviators would 
most likely communicate their intentions and thoughts as much as possible prior 
to submitting a bid.  In this section, each aviator’s choices can encompass a first 
move commitment, or a threat or promise to another aviator.  In this model, I 
assume that the true values for Rose and Colin do not change and that neither 
would bid below their true value.  In this scenario, I provide the same payoff 
matrix as the first-price sealed-bid auction; however, the underbid values are no 
longer considered.  See Figure 5.6 below for the payoff matrix and a spreadsheet 









 In this strategic move first-price sealed-bid reverse auction scenario, the 
likely outcome would be for each bidder to overbid their true value.  Colin does 
not receive any surplus no matter what he bids in the first-price auction.  Rose 
receives a $7,000 surplus if she can convince Colin to use his overbid value in 
the auction while she also overbids.  See the spreadsheet for the scenarios that 
represent the first move, threat, and promises.  Threats would not even be 
considered because the more one threatens to lower his or her  bid to hurt the 
other bidder, then the better chance of decreasing one’s surplus or even 
underbidding one’s true value.  The bottom line in a strategic move scenario is 
that if bidders are able to communicate with each other, they will undoubtedly try 
to convince the other to overbid his or her  true value in order to maximize 
surplus.   
H. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, Game Theory and different strategies (Decision Theory 
and Strategic moves) were studied to determine how bidders could determine the 
value to bid in a reverse auction.  Each mathematical scenario provides a bidder 
a more educated way to submit a bid if auctions are used to set aviator bonuses 
in the future.  The auction comes down to two choices: First-price or Second-
price.  The Revenue Equivalence Theorem states that both auctions would result 
in the same bonus cost, because surplus maximizing risk neutral bidders in a 
first-price auction will overstate and overbid their true value.   If bidders are risk 
averse, it will reduce the tendency toward overbidding, but overbidding becomes 
more pronounced if bidders can communicate. 
The first section of the chapter used Game Theory to show that bidding 
one’s true value is the dominant strategy for each bidder in a second-price 
reverse auction.  This is beneficial to everyone involved: it relays the true market 
value to the seller, and the bidder receives a bonus that exceeds the value that 
he or she deems appropriate. The services should be able to determine the 
appropriate bonus amount utilizing the second-price format as each bidder would 
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bid his or her true value.  With this auction format, the bidding strategy is clear, 
once understood among the bidders:  always bid one’s true value; there is no 
information to gather, except to know what the true value is to remain in the 
service, and no reason to communicate threats or promises..  On the contrary, a 
first-price auction would entail a more difficult bidding strategy, involving a 
tradeoff between risk and return, and the interactions between these for risk 
averse bidders. There is also more potential for gaming throughout the process.  
Their would be significant wasted effort among bidders trying to determine 
others’ true values and strategically communicating threats and promises 
regarding their own bids.  The seller would never learn the true market value of 
the aviators at a given moment.  When the player overbids, the service loses out 
on surplus, and when the player underbids, the bidder is losing out on his 
surplus.  A true value bid will determine the market value of any given player at 
the time of the auction.   
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
 At the outset of writing this thesis, I questioned whether Army Aviation 
would be able to retain its aviators in the midst of the Global War on Terrorism 
while the airlines are starting to replace their baby boomer pilots.  I was mostly 
concerned with the commissioned officers in the aviator pool, as these aviators 
were not currently offered any bonus; only the warrant officer branch of aviators 
is offered a bonus.  Throughout the months of writing this thesis, the Army 
started to hint that there may be bonuses available to commissioned officers in 
every branch of the Army and that the Aviation bonus would be a $35,000.  As of 
13 September, 2007, the commissioned Aviator is now being offered an incentive 
to stay in the Army.  The incentives available are as follows for the year group 
officer 1999 through 2004: 
 1.  Cash Bonus - $35,000 for the officer to extend 36 months past their 
initial obligation, or 
 2.  Graduate School – Priority of school funding will go to year groups 
2003 and 2004, or 
 3.  Military School – Priority of schooling will go year groups 2003 and 
2004 for Ranger School or the Defense Language Institute although other 
schools are available, or 
 4.  Branch/Specialty of choice, or 
 5.  Post of Choice  
Although my year group, 1997, does not fall into this scenario, I am hopeful that 
the Army finally recognizes the retention issues that most officers have been 
forecasting for the future.   
 In an informal survey of Aviation officers in the year groups described 
above, the amount of money bonus appears to make the officers on the fence 
think twice about getting out or staying in.  The three officers I have queried say 
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that their decision to get out has already been made; although they were 
intrigued by the bonus. Current and expected future deployments have taken 
their toll, and they are more than willing to attempt their luck at finding a job for 
an airline or the U.S. Customs.  For those officers who have already decided to 
stay, the $35,000 bonus serves as extra money, or a pure surplus.  For those on 
the fence of whether to get out or stay in, the bonus is a great incentive and 
should provide the impetus for that officer to stay in the Army.   
 In this thesis, I have described the bonus and incentive program prior to 
13 September 2007 and its past history.  I then continued the thesis by 
describing Auction Theory and ways that it could be used for aviator bonuses, 
including some of the drawbacks arising out of the  use of  Auction Theory.  I 
completed my thesis with a mathematical description using various strategies of 
how one might bid in a reverse first-price or second-price sealed-bid auction.  I 
have concluded that the services should utilize a second-price auction format to 
increase the probability that the bidders do, in fact, bid their true values.  They 
may or may not win the auction as the outright bidder; however, winning bidders 
would receive a bonus that is comparable to the market value of a pilot. 
To determine the proper bonus for the current market, a second-priced, 
sealed-bid auction is proposed.  This type of auction would forecast the current 
market at the time of the auction.  Competition should constrain the bonus 
offered, yet, those aviators that believe their value is lower than others would not 
necessarily be punished by submitting a lower bid because the winning bonus 
amount would equal the first excluded bid for all aviators.  Different times call for 
different incentives.  One way to determine an incentive that is responsive to 
changing market conditions is the second-price, sealed-bid reverse auction.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
 Further study could determine how the Army decided on the value of 
$35,000 for three years and whether the incentive is working.  Other services 
have offered up to $25,000 a year for an incentive and the Army still lags behind.  
Just the fact that commissioned officers are now being considered for an aviation 
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incentive is a small victory and a smart way to assist in retention.  Prior to the 
recent release of this current incentive, dated 13 September 2007, only warrant 
officer aviators were offered a bonus.   
 Another area of research could involve an actual economics experiment 
on auctions applied to this particular problem.   Upon completing this economics 
experiment, the data could be used to simulate a reverse auction for aviation 
officers two years prior to completing their commitment.  Data on these specific 
aviators could be gathered through Human Resources Command and possibly a 
survey.  From my experience, an officer has a good idea about whether he is 
staying in the service or resigning at the two year prior date.  Within their last 
year of service, individuals are concerned about their exit from the service and 
focused on what they can do to transition into the civilian sector.   
 The bottom line for an auction is to determine who captures the surplus.  In some 
cases more of the surplus is transferred to the service member while in others more is 
captured by the service.  The goal is to help the services accomplish their retention goals 
while recapturing more of the surplus. Further research in auctions should be considered 
to accomplish this objective.   One possibility is the Sequential Self-Selection Auction 
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